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Social contract thought has always contained multiple and mutually conflicting lines of argument; the minimalist
contractarianism so influential today represents the weaker of two main constellations of claims. I make the case
for a Kantian contract theory that emphasizes the bedrock principle of consent of the governed instead of the mere
heuristic device of the exit from the state of nature. Such a shift in emphasis resolves two classic difficulties: tradi-
tional contract theory’s ahistorical presumption of a pre-political settlement, and its impossibly high demands on
citizens seeking to practice self-rule. Kant’s solutions to these problems of property rights and citizenship are found
in his political works, rather than the ethical works through which Kant’s political theory is usually interpreted.
and political scientists interested in game theory
sometimes take their grounding assumptions from
this body of work (Morris and Oppenheimer 2004).
The social contract forms the central idea of John
Rawls’s 1971 A Theory of Justice, a book widely cred-
ited with the revival of academic political philosophy
in the United States.
Yet none of these contributors, popular or schol-
arly, has been able to provide a satisfactory response
to two persistent complaints about social contract
theory’s application to imperfect political conditions.
First, how can political authority derive from contract
theory’s frankly hypothetical, ahistorical description
of pre-political human agents agreeing to leave the
state of nature and submit to government? Second,
how can authoritative consent be granted by real-
world citizens subject to conditions ranging from
imperfect to utterly disabling? Sugden, in the intro-
duction to a collection of essays celebrating David
Gauthier’s minimalist contractarianism, glosses the
two questions as “baseline” and “reciprocity” prob-
lems, adding that their persistence makes “even the
most committed contractarians uneasy” (Sugden
1993).2 Frustration with contract theory’s failure to
answer such questions has led some theorists to
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he language of social contract permeates both
politics and political science. Thomas Friedman
complains in the New York Times about some
countries’ lack of social contract legitimacy, employ-
ing the historically dominant sense of a voluntary con-
tract among citizens to form a government (Friedman
2005); opinion page writers complain that proposed
social security reform “breaks the social contract”
between government and senior citizens, using a
slightly less traditional sense of the term.1 Comment-
ing on a brawl at a basketball game between the
Indiana Pacers and the Detroit Pistons, the commis-
sioner of the National Basketball Association, David
Stern, complains that the “social contract” between
players and fans has been broken (Lyon 2004).
Political scientists, too, rely on concepts from
social contract theory, including “consent,” “interest,”
and the “state of nature.” In Political Science: The State
of the Discipline (Katznelson and Milner 2002a),
representatives of a wide variety of subdisciplines cite
such contractarian concepts as the consent of the gov-
erned (Katznelson and Milner 2002b), property rights
and the state (Levi 2002), and the anarchic state of
nature (Powell 2002). Philosophers and economists
continue to treat contractarianism as a live project,
1The Oxford English Dictionary (1989) lists both senses, but places priority on the sense of “mutual agreement which, according to
Rousseau’s Contrat social (1762), forms the basis of human society.”
2Sugden does not characterize Gauthier’s contractarianism as “minimalist,” as I do, but as “strong.” For Sugden, “weak” contractarians
such as Locke, Rawls, and Harsanyi “inject” impartial starting conditions into their theories, biasing them in favor of morality. Sugden’s
“strong” contractarians, including Gauthier and Hobbes, may end up claiming that rationality favors morality, but they begin only with
the principles of rational choice (Sugden 1990).
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dismiss it as “fiction,” or to attempt to go “beyond the
social contract” with an alternative approach (Nuss-
baum 2004; Shapiro 2003). However, I argue that these
criticisms reach only the minimalist type of social
contract theory, not the provisional contractarianism
advocated by Kant and his successors.3
Both normative and empirical scholars of politics
have mistakenly identified social contract theory with
minimalist contractarianism. Students of democratic
politics often presume that minimalist values such 
as a pre-political right to property and minimalist
assumptions about independent citizen capacity rep-
resent uncontroversial contractarian principles. Social
and political theorists, making the same presumption
about the status of the minimalist view, argue against
its uncritical acceptance. Students of democratic pol-
itics tend to presume contractarian values because
they are widely held and popular in practice; critics 
of contractarian thought argue that these same values
are ahistorical and incoherent. Paradoxically, both
sides are right. The contractarian values undergirding
present-day democracy are indeed broadly accepted,
but they are not the values defended by contemporary
minimalist contractarians. Political theorists have
rightly criticized minimalist views of property and
citizen capacity “as just one more installment in a tra-
dition inherited from Locke of mystifying anachro-
nism” (Braybrooke 1987, 750). In identifying contract
theory generally with the minimalist version of it,
scholars of politics mistakenly focus on the conditions
of consent, rather than the principle itself. Moreover,
since the conditions of genuine consent change over
time and space, the values commonly associated with
contractarianism in the literature have grown increas-
ingly irrelevant to arguments about democratic gov-
ernance today (see Pierson 2004).
By adhering to a seventeenth-century model of
civil society, in which individuals independently
endowed with property and with the capacity to exer-
cise political judgment contract together to found the
state, minimalist social contract theory fails to realize
the fundamental contractarian value that legitimate
rule is by the consent of the governed.4 As Kant rec-
ognizes in his work on provisional right, vindicating
such a principle in the dynamic political world
requires an ever-changing set of institutions aimed at
adjusting political reality in the direction of its ideals.
It does not make sense, then, to identify contractari-
anism proper with certain seventeenth-century views
on the necessary preconditions of genuine consent.
The social contract idea remains the basis of contem-
porary democratic politics; particular theories of
property rights and citizen capacity have continuing
relevance only insofar as they promote contractarian
freedom under prevailing social circumstances.
Despite its continuing association among aca-
demics with an outmoded and particular set of con-
ditions, the discourse of social contract has not lost its
popular allure. Kant understood that the underlying
logic of social contract as the exercise of collective self-
rule, as the real-world approximation of the moral
ideal of freedom, holds far more promise than the
mere heuristic story of the exit from the state of
nature. Ordinary language mirrors this Kantian
insight, emphasizing the voluntary choices of human
agents; when Stern used the term “social contract” in
criticizing the basketball brawlers, “he meant the
unspoken understanding that there were certain
things one side didn’t do and certain places the other
side didn’t go” (Lyon 2004, E1).
I shall argue that Kant’s revisionist contractarian-
ism improves upon conventional minimalist social
contract theory by giving a dynamic account of the
property-rights and citizen-capacity conditions of
consent while retaining contract theory’s attractive
commitments to autonomy, equality, and political
freedom. Kant’s account of the provisional right to
property addresses the first traditional complaint
about contract theory’s unempirical commitment to
an imaginary “baseline” status quo. Kant’s account of
active citizenship, though riddled with its own prob-
lems, resolves the second traditional complaint about
“reciprocal” citizen capacity. More generally, Kant’s
approach to thinking about legitimate institutions as
a series of provisional efforts to improve imperfect
political reality while maintaining the conditions of
the possibility of progress provides a model for poli-
tics that is both more realistic and closer to contrac-
tarian essential principles than the minimalist view.
3Provisionalism has recently been given a thoughtful treatment in
Gutmann and Thompson’s collection of essays on deliberative
democracy (2004). Though Rawls constructs a Kantian contrac-
tarianism, he does not advocate provisional right; nor is Rawls
much influenced by Kant’s political, as opposed to his ethical,
ideas. See Shaw (2005).
4In a similar vein, Przeworski calls for putting “the consensualist
theory of democracy where it belongs—in the Museum of Eigh-
teenth-century Thought” (Przeworski 1999, 44). Przeworski’s
minimalism is very different from Gauthier’s minimalism; in fact,
Przeworski’s minimalist democratic theory exemplifies an appro-
priate use of contractarian thought in political science, as he does
not confuse historically particular enabling conditions with
democracy itself. For the purposes of this article, “minimalism”
refers to contractarian thought that would limit realization of the
principle of government by consent by means of the conditions of
that consent, including not only Gauthier, but also Buchanan and
Tullock (1962) and Nozick (1974).
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The Provisional Response to
Minimalist Contractarianism
A provisional understanding of contract theory
demonstrates that minimalist bias toward a “baseline”
status quo and unrealistic expectations for “recipro-
cal” citizenship are not essential elements of the con-
tractarian argument. Kantian provisionalism denies
what Gauthier asserts, that pre-political circumstances
take normative priority over political will. The logic of
contract theory, with its central ideal that legitimate
government rests on the consent of the governed, does
not entail any single, conclusive system of property
rights. Moreover, the changing empirical context of
politics implies changing pragmatic conditions for the
satisfaction of its ideals of citizenship. Seventeenth-
century English landholders brought very different
capabilities to the political table than twenty-first
century wage-laborers do, and a minimalist contrac-
tarianism vindicating the autonomy of the former
may end up denying the freedom of the latter. Sophis-
ticated contract theory has always been hypothetical
rather than historical, asking about the legitimation of
current government rather than justifying it accord-
ing to any real agreement among distant ancestors.5
But some contexts require more hypothetical distance
than others. In the context of the English civil wars,
talk of choosing to suspend the exercise of some
natural rights in return for common security was at
least plausible; the choice between life with or without
a state was also relatively close to the reality of periods
of lawlessness and frequent, violent, changes of
regime. In the rich democracies these days, the 
hypothetical choice to submit to state sovereignty 
rather than remain a free agent with full exercise of
one’s natural rights seems far less plausible. Wealth
and other resources, even developed natural talents,
that a supposed free agent might bring to the con-
tractarian bargaining table all depend in one way or
another on the stability and environment guaranteed
by the state.
Must a Kantian contractarian conclude that since
all social goods are made possible by the order guar-
anteed by the state, collective priorities as assigned by
the sovereign trump all other concerns? Certainly
not.6 Instead of reasoning from the hypothetical
example of the transition from the state of nature,
which has never been more than a highly useful mode
of illustration for the logic of contractarianism, we
ought to reason from the social contract’s most basic
commitment: legitimate rule is by consent. Rule by
consent is a provisional principle, and the conditions
of its even partial satisfaction vary according to the
political context. In present-day rich democracies, the
conditions of citizen self-rule are more demanding
than ever. Today’s minimalist contractarians recognize
this fact, but they draw the wrong conclusion. Gau-
thier argues, for example, that only relatively enabled
citizens capable of exchanging benefits with their
fellows (and this criterion excludes the severely dis-
abled, among others) ought to be parties to the social
contract that legitimates government (1986, 17).7 But
modern citizens do not assemble a package of
enabling conditions under pre-political circum-
stances. Instead, the development of citizen capacity
occurs in a dynamic institutional setting in which state
and nonstate actors respond to broad sets of incen-
tives set by the marketplace, government regulation,
and historical conditions. The distribution of citizen
capacities in any given context is the product of polit-
ical negotiations as well as social and economic con-
ditions, not to mention countless decisions made by
individuals more or less interested in self-develop-
ment (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001; Fraser
1994; Orloff 1993; Putnam 2000; Skocpol 2003). Since
citizen capacity is an essential condition of contrac-
tarian consent, contractarian theory cannot simply
presume that agents bring such capabilities to the
political arena under all possible social circumstances.
Recognizing that the imperatives of the state-of-
nature hypothesis conflict with those of the demand
5David Hume famously lampoons the idea of an historical social
contract in his 1748 essay, “Of the Original Contract”: “The face
of the earth is continually changing, by the encrease of small king-
doms into great empires, by the dissolution of great empires into
smaller kingdoms, by the planting of colonies, by the migration of
tribes. Is there anything discoverable in all these events, but force
and violence?” (Hume 1994, 190).
6This is the choice to which Rawls refers near the end of his Lec-
tures on the History of Moral Philosophy, where he argues against
Hegel that one need not choose between the priority of either
“single individuals as atoms” or “the state as a concrete whole.”
Instead, Rawls points to Kant’s contractarian theory, of which he
says that “it is different from starting with single individuals as
atoms independent from all social ties and then building up from
them as a basis. And it does not use the idea of the state as spiri-
tual substance and individuals as mere accidents of its substan-
tiality; the state is the arena in which individuals can pursue their
ends according to principles each can see are reasonable and fair”
(2000, 364–65). See also Morris and Oppenheimer (2004, 7).
7The exclusive consequences of this view of contractualism are
agreed upon by minimalist contractualists and their many critics;
by contrast, I hold that exclusivity is one of two possible solutions
to the problem of autonomous citizen consent, and the less attrac-
tive of the two. Gauthier even suggests that social contract theory
as an ideology is undermined by the inclusion of previously
excluded groups (1977, 160–63).
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for government by consent, Gauthier chooses the
former: “A nonarbitrary society must improve on the
natural outcome for everyone” (1977, 141). Gauthier’s
declaration of principle emphasizes the minimalist
presumption in favor of the status quo in property
rights, as well as a counterfactual baseline state of
nature. But note that despite his explicit decision to
accord priority to property rights, the more funda-
mental value presumed in this sentence is that of
“nonarbitrary society.” Gauthier recognizes that the
human aspiration to transcend arbitrariness is what I
would call a provisional goal; of course every social
condition contains arbitrary, unjust, morally irrele-
vant elements. However, like all social contract theo-
rists, Gauthier is ultimately committed to an ideal of
human freedom. Perfect freedom is impossible, but
freedom as an ideal is not only possible but necessary
for Gauthier and for contractarian thought of all
stripes. Gauthier rightly prioritizes freedom, but
wrongly identifies it with the state-of-nature hypoth-
esis rather than the more fundamental ideal of gov-
ernment by consent.
For Gauthier, a free citizen is someone of whom
one can say that it is in his rational interest to be a
member of the state that has authority over him (this
is the exit-from-the-state-of-nature test, which I call
the “minimalist test”). Gauthier knows that real citi-
zens are not offered such a choice, but he argues that
legitimate government must be one that ideal citizens
would freely choose to join. He uses a rich definition
of freedom that includes a Kantian dimension of
moral autonomy, explicitly rejecting what he calls
“Hobbesian or anarchistic interaction, in which each
may pursue his greatest benefit without concern for
the effects of this pursuit on others” (1986, 258). Gau-
thier’s choice of the minimalist, join-it-or-leave-it test,
however, cannot do justice to his notion of freedom in
any but the simplest of counterfactual contexts. In
fact, the demands of the kind of political freedom that
would make government by consent at least a provi-
sional reality require modern contractarians to reject
the conclusions that minimalists draw from the state-
of-nature hypothesis, including especially their
account of property rights.
Provisional Respect for Property
Kant’s politics should not be derived from his ethics.
Anyone reading Kant’s political essays even casually
will notice that they are filled with fascinating argu-
ments and hypotheses about the practice of politics,
even though most of the secondary literature on Kant
limits itself to formalistic abstractions illustrated by
ill-chosen examples from ethical treatises like the
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals.8 In his polit-
ical essays, Kant gives us arguments about live politi-
cal questions: how to trick the monarch into making
himself obsolete; why permanent rule-giving of any
kind is illegitimate; why freedom of expression
matters; why gradualism is to be preferred to revolu-
tion; why the intelligensia should get special rights(!);
how regime change occurs; what institutions promote
international peace; how to treat foreigners rightly,
and so forth. True, Kant takes the conclusions of his
ethical work for granted in his political theorizing; he
treats corollaries of the categorical imperative as con-
clusive principles of political right. However, Kant in
his political theory is concerned not simply to lay out
another ideal system of politics, however well or ill-
grounded, but to understand the relationships among
pragmatic politics, public applications of moral judg-
ment to political practice, and the processes of politi-
cal change.9 Kant does construct an ideal republican
political system, but his main theoretical innovation
lies elsewhere, in his account of provisional right. Pro-
visional right, as I explain below, emphatically does
not mean a temporary free pass for wrongdoing in the
name of pragmatic political ends.10 Instead, it is some-
thing much subtler and more interesting: provisional
right is a response to the inevitable uncertainties that
arise from the hybrid, half-ideal, half-empirical world
of politics. Thus provisionalism allows Kant to
analyze, even to celebrate, the moral element in polit-
ical life without retreating to the usual castle-in-the-
air built by conclusive theory in spite of reality.
It is one thing, however, to posit that morality
matters for politics and quite another to argue that 
a particular set of moral principles is conclusively
authoritative.11 Political theorists who place Kant’s
8Some recent exceptions include: Shaw (2005), LaVaque-Manty
(2002), Muthu (2000), Flikschuh (2000), Cavallar (1999), and
Laursen (1992).
9In this regard, see Pogge’s interesting critique of Rawls’s interpre-
tation of Kant. Pogge argues that Kant’s politics can accommodate
Kantian morality as a comprehensive doctrine, but need not
exclude other comprehensive doctrines. According to Pogge’s
reading, “Kant emerges as the freestanding liberal par excellence”
(2002, 149; see also Ellis 2005).
10It would also be a misunderstanding to confuse provisionality
with relativism. Research in the history of political thought and
observation of contemporary political behavior reveal the near-
ubiquity of conclusivist moral argument in political life. As Kant
famously puts it, “true politics can . . . not take a step without
having already paid homage to morals” (1996, 8:380).
11Provisional arguments take the form of hypothetical imperatives:
if we are committed to x, then y and such follows in z and such a
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ethics at the center of his politics make a mistake: they
take the content of Kant’s moral system to be critical,
when what matters for politics is the fact of human
morality itself. Since human beings are capable of
agency, any politics that ignores the role of judgments
about the right made by political agents will be inac-
curate: political ideals have concrete political effects.
Kant argues that a single moral law governs all human
agents, but even so, as a clear-eyed interpreter of the
political world, he knows that the sources of political
authority in really existing societies vary. Thus he
argues for provisional rather than conclusive political
right: right that applies in the absence of universally
authoritative political judgment. A general formula-
tion for provisional right in specifically Kantian lan-
guage is: “always leave open the possibility of entering
into a rightful condition” (6:347).12 Kant identifies the
distinction between provisional and conclusive right
and applies it to various political topics, such as the
determination of which violations of international
right are immediate threats to the possibility of world
peace, and which might be provisionally tolerated
(8:343–49). Even as Kant presumes in his ethics that
he has identified a universally authoritative set of
moral rules, in his politics, he recognizes both human
agency and plurality. For example, Kant argues in
“What is Enlightenment?” that any group of authori-
ties attempting to set down conclusive moral rules 
for posterity necessarily violates future generations’
human agency (8:39).
Obviously, there are plenty of tensions in Kant’s
work. The political theory Kant and others derive
straight from his ethical first principles is a nice, mod-
erate republican social contract view of some histori-
cal importance (Beiser 1987, 1992). Even Patrick Riley,
whose seminal work of the 1970s and 1980s renewed
interest in Kant’s political thought, can generate only
moderate enthusiasm for the ideal theory, calling it
“the most adequate of the social contract theories”
(Riley 1982, 125). It was not news, even in Kant’s time,
that a republican system of government ought to
respect basic freedoms, ought to separate the execu-
tive and legislative authorities, ought to guarantee
equal protection under the law.13 These views com-
prise a static, rather than a dynamic, political theory.
Kant himself plays down the value of this type of intel-
lectual labor, saying in The Conflict of the Faculties that
building ideal republics is ultimately irresponsible
(7:92).
Instead, strangely ignored by nearly everyone but
Habermas (whose Structural Transformation of the
Public Sphere ([1962] 1989) contains a brief but bril-
liant exposition of Kant’s theory of publicity), Kant
struggles in a series of efforts to come up with a
dynamic theory of politics appropriate to limited
rational beings interacting with each other. His formal
contract theory is set out in the Rechtslehre, the first
half of the Metaphysics of Morals, and begins with an
account of property rights that starts out conventional
and becomes a radical departure from the contractar-
ian tradition. With regard to property rights, Kant’s
provisional contractarianism turns conventional
wisdom on its head. Kant does not accord priority to
the status quo in property holding, but neither does
he posit a radical break between the state of nature
and the civil state. Instead, given the clay feet of every
existing state, he argues for provisional recognition of
property rights. Kant avoids the traps of according
absolute priority either to a “baseline” state of nature
or to the state (more particularly: either to individual
property rights or to redistribution according to some
general interest (6:323–24)).
Kant developed the concept of provisional right
over a series of works and first made sustained use of
it in Perpetual Peace, two years before setting out the
social contract theory of the Rechtslehre. For Kant, the
concept of provisional right applies to institutions
that imperfectly mirror their own normative princi-
ples; since all existing political institutions do this,
pragmatic politics must follow a rule of provisional
rather than conclusive right. In his Rechtslehre, Kant
claims that the right that applies in real-world civil
societies must be “provisional” (provisorisch) rather
than “conclusive” (peremptorisch): provisional right
holds in anticipation of and preparation for the more
perfect state of conclusive right (6:257). Kant uses an
early version of this distinction in his famous essay on
international politics, Perpetual Peace, where he argues
that even though many types of state action are incontext. Arguments with conclusivist ambitions—based on divine
right, the ideal speech situation, rational choice, biological imper-
atives, or the greatest happiness of the greatest number, to take a
few examples—aim for universal application.
12References to Kant’s works are designated by the volume and
page number in the standard Prussian Academy edition. In
English, the Cambridge University Press editions of Kant’s works
include the standard pagination. The translations given here are
from Gregor’s excellent volume in the Cambridge edition (Kant
1996).
13Kant’s views on the importance of freedom of the pen were
radical, original, and even “subversive” in their historical context,
as Laursen (1986, 1992) has established. However, it is Kant’s
hypotheses about the role of press freedom as a social agent of
change that distinguish his theory from more general arguments
for freedom of expression, and these hypotheses form an essential
part of his dynamic theory of provisional right.
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blatant violation of universal moral norms, only some
of those violations must cease immediately. States that
make peace treaties while secretly preparing for war,
that forcibly interfere in the domestic affairs of other
states, and that use methods that poison the possibil-
ity of future trust, such as assassination, not only
violate moral norms, but by their conduct prevent the
possibility of future peaceful relations; these types of
violation must not be tolerated. On the other hand,
international actors which violate moral norms by
treating the state as personal patrimony, maintaining
standing armies, or using national debt to promote
military adventure ought to cease such practices, but
they may do so gradually, since these three violations
do not prevent the possibility of progress as such
(8:343–47).14 For Kant, the primary rule of provisional
right, which is the rule that applies to all societies
between the state of nature and the ideal republic, is
to promote the possibility of progress.15
Similarly, in his discussion of property in the
section on private right in the Rechtslehre, Kant dis-
tinguishes between provisional and conclusive rights,
and in the process distinguishes himself from his
predecessors in social contract theory. “Conclusive
acquisition takes place only in the civil condition,”
whereas provisional acquisition takes place “under the
idea” of civil right (6:264). Provisional possession for
Kant is possession in the absence of a rightful civil
condition. All existing societies fall into this category:
their people are not in a state of nature, but they do
not enjoy a just legal system as sketched in Kant’s
image of the ideal republic. Thus property rights in
these intermediate societies, which include all real
ones, are always provisional.
Private right, for Kant, is “the sum of laws that do
not need to be promulgated.” That is, private right
exists without actual legislation; a people need not
even be constituted as such before private right comes
into play. By this, however, Kant does not mean to
agree with minimalist contract theorists that private
right prevails in a state of nature. The contrary is the
case: though it comes into force without explicit leg-
islation on the part of any body, private right by its
very nature implies the existence of a state of civil
order (6:210; 6:256–57). Flikschuh, in a brilliant
analysis of a much-misunderstood passage, explains
the differences between Locke and Kant on property
and the state of nature: “In fact, Kant faults the
Lockean view on two counts: first, in thinking that
property rights denote a direct relation between
subject and object; and, second, in assuming that a
unilateral act of empirical acquisition (such as the act
of investing one’s labour in the object) can establish a
rightful claim . . .” (2000, 118). Kant insists that there
can be no rights to things as such; rights for Kant are
one kind of relation among persons: “Speaking strictly
and literally, there is . . . no (direct) right to a thing”
(6:261). All such relations, if they are to honor the only
natural right which is to autonomy (6:237), must be
based not on a unilateral but a general will (and uni-
lateral here of course includes any number of wills less
than the whole); by their very existence property
rights presume the republican state, at least 
provisionally.
While for Locke property rights are established as
soon as one’s labor has been mixed with natural
resources, for Kant, the necessity of property’s possi-
bility implies a condition in which mutual obligations
to respect each other’s autonomy prevails (Locke
[1689] 2003; Flikschuh 2000). These rights of persons
against each other are one practical application of
Kant’s universal principle of right: “Any action is right
if it can coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance
with a universal law, or if on its maxim the freedom
of choice of each can coexist with everyone’s freedom
in accordance with a universal law” (6:230). Kant
claims to have deduced the possibility of property
rights from this principle conclusively, a claim which
has not withstood the test of time (Rosen 1993).
However, what matters for my purposes here is that
Kantian property rights are, first, based on relations
among persons rather than between persons and
things, and, second, divided between provisional and
conclusive rights.
For Kant, the only natural right is the right to
autonomy (6:237). Why, then, would he begin his
account of political obligation with the contractarian
story of the pre-political establishment of at least pro-
visional rights to private property? The answer must
lie in the physical conditions of pragmatic autonomy,
though of course an argument from abstract princi-
ple such as that given in the main text of the Recht-
slehre cannot begin from such “anthropological”
premises. As Wolff (1998) has argued regarding this
passage, human beings must appropriate objects from
14On Kantian liberalism and the democratic peace thesis, see
Danilovic and Clare (2005), who make a convincing case that
empirical work on the democratic peace ought to incorporate
specifically liberal variables rather than relatively blunt measures
of democratic status.
15Note that this pragmatic norm is at odds with the received
wisdom on Kant’s politics, which distills a rigoristic set of politi-
cal principles out of his ethical works. Readers of Kant’s political
works will enjoy a very different sort of argument, one that is
context-sensitive and attentive to modern concerns like the diffi-
culty of constructing a predictive science of politics.
  
nature in order to sustain themselves. If, the argument
goes, autonomy is to be practicable, some independ-
ent access to our means of sustenance is necessary for
us. Some form of private property, then, must be pos-
sible for potentially autonomous agents.
Note that in this case, private property is justified
as a condition of possible human agency. Minimalist
contractarians, by contrast, take private property as a
part of what contracting agents bring to the pre-polit-
ical bargaining table (Gauthier 1986, 1993). Property
on this minimalist account is a constitutive element of
personhood. Not so for Kant. Even though elsewhere
Kant makes a robust pragmatic case for respecting
property rights through political transitions, he does
not make the case for any fundamental right to prop-
erty. Kant’s direct argument on the subject, the failed
deduction, only deduces the necessity of the possibil-
ity of property rights. Instead, for Kant property rights
ought to be respected provisionally because such
respect serves other, more fundamental interests,
including especially an interest in political stability.
In the minimalist contractarian story, independ-
ent rational agents form a society and authorize a gov-
ernment in order to protect their lives and property.
Government by consent in this account follows from
the conditions of the exit from the state of nature
(what Gauthier calls departures from the natural
outcome). Kant’s contract theory reverses these
values. Agents must enter into mutually enforceable
and mutually agreed upon contracts in order to vin-
dicate their natural right of autonomy, that is, of being
free from determination by another’s choice. No
agreement, even one to respect property, can be prior
to this fundamental agreement for Kant. However,
since even outside established society and rule of law,
human beings will need to appropriate objects in
order to survive, Kant grants provisionally rightful
status to property held in the absence of the just state.
Thus for Kant, the conditions under which agents
would rationally exchange their natural freedom for
the security of government are relatively unimportant;
what matters are the conditions under which govern-
ment by consent is at least provisionally possible (and
these conditions may well include some form of prop-
erty rights). Provisional property rights thus follow
from Kant’s natural right of autonomy and its princi-
ple that legitimate government is by consent.
Kant introduces the problem of property rights
thus: “It is possible to have something external as one’s
own only in a rightful condition, under an authority
giving laws publicly, that is, in a civil condition”
(6:255). Kant has already argued that ownership of
property must be possible; now he sets out the dis-
tinction between natural and positive rights, arguing
that the only natural right is to one’s freedom (in the
sense of autonomy outlined earlier: freedom from
others making choices for one) (6:237–38). Kant
argues that for property and personal autonomy to
coexist, no one should have to acknowledge anyone
else’s property without guarantees that his own prop-
erty will be acknowledged in exchange. To do so would
be to violate the only natural right, since the one uni-
laterally acknowledging others’ property will have to
rely on the others’ presumed good will for the secu-
rity of his own property (and will thus enter a condi-
tion of heteronomy) (6:255–56; 6:307). Since for Kant,
only a “collective general (common) and powerful
will” can provide the guarantees necessary for this
property rights regime to exist, a “unilateral will” (any
will less than general) cannot command anyone’s obe-
dience without infringing on autonomy. Potentially
interacting persons, then, must submit themselves to
a common source of authority for the validation of
their reciprocal natural right (6:256).
Unlike minimalist contractarians, Kant’s contract
theory holds that property rights do not precede the
advent of the state. He admits the necessary possibil-
ity of private property generally, but argues that their
assertion under heteronomous conditions amounts 
to an illegitimate, unilateral fiat. Rather than denying
the possibility of just property holding outside (an
unreachable) state of republican perfection, however,
Kant introduces the concept of provisionality:
In a state of nature something external can actually be
mine or yours but only provisionally. . . . Possession in
anticipation of and preparation for the civil condition,
which can be based only on a law of common will,
possession which therefore accords with the possibility
of such a condition, is provisionally rightful possession,
whereas possession found in an actual civil condition
would be conclusive possession (6:256–57).
For Kant, an actual civil condition requires the general
will to be realized; in the Rechtslehre, “Theory and
Practice,” and elsewhere, Kant sketches the demand-
ing conditions required of any polity wishing to
conform to ideal republican standards. All existing
states fall short of these ideals, though Kant argues
that by their very claims to provide order they implic-
itly recognize the standards’ normative authority.
Since all existing states fall between pre-political chaos
and ideal republican governance, provisional right is
the rule that applies to them (6:264).
Thus Kant’s contractarianism places first priority
on the demand for autonomous consent, and only
grants secondary status to private property as a con-
dition of civil society’s acceptance of government.
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Kant does call for the status quo in property rights to
be respected during political transition, but not in the
name of any original legitimacy. Instead, he refers to
a general societal interest in reformist rather than rev-
olutionary transitions.16 Kant’s argument for respect-
ing the status quo in private property thus rests on the
empirical hypothesis that the moral interest at stake
(everyone’s interest in living under some stable order,
even one only on the way to justice) would be best
served by a policy of provisional respect. The claim is
in principle falsifiable and subject to different answers
at different times and places.17 A Kantian contractari-
anism takes no conclusive stand on property rights;
instead, property is accorded provisional respect as
circumstances demand.
Theory and Practice of Citizen
Consent
In the Rechtslehre, Kant famously and wrongly sets out
a distinction between active and passive citizens, con-
signing a large portion of society to mere civil rights
while limiting positive political participation to a
minority. I am not interested in defending this posi-
tion. What matters about it for my purposes, however,
is that Kant’s awkward distinction reveals his aware-
ness of a critical problem in making his version of
contract theory coherent. As I have argued, Kantian
contractarianism prioritizes the basic principle of
government by consent over any set of presumed
natural rights to property carried over from prepolit-
ical existence. Such a theory places great demands on
citizens as autonomous self-legislators. Making good
on the ideal of autonomous consent is no easy task.
Minimalist contract theorists such as Gauthier seek to
limit reciprocal political obligation to those “enabled”
to exchange fruitfully with their fellows (this follows
from their emphasis on the conditions of a hypothet-
ical exit from nature). Other students of politics have
described citizenship as an ongoing series of battles
for rights (Marshall 1964), or sought to limit demo-
cratic citizenship to those societies predisposed to it
(Huntington 1996) or developed enough to handle 
it (Mill 1989). Kant, then, is certainly not alone in
seeking to address the problem of the high demands
of contractarian citizenship through exclusion.
However, the democratic implications of his moral
presumptions and the dynamic nature of his provi-
sional theory of politics make it much harder for Kant
than for other theorists coherently to maintain exclu-
sion as his solution to this problem. As I shall demon-
strate, the resulting tensions in Kant’s writing on
citizenship point in the direction of a Kantian con-
tractarianism that rejects exclusion and thus more
fully embraces its commitment to the bedrock princi-
ple of citizen consent.
At Rechtslehre (6:314–15), Kant makes his notori-
ous distinction between active and passive citizenship,
arguing that full citizens must be free, equal, and inde-
pendent. In order to satisfy the criterion of independ-
ence, citizens must have what he calls civil personality.
He illustrates his distinction with a series of contrasts
between citizens able to support themselves and those
who are somehow dependent on others for their liveli-
hoods, including among others women, apprentices,
domestic servants, and day laborers. This distinction
has been widely and rightly criticized as illiberal and
undemocratic. However, in order to understand how
provisional contractarians address the problem of
citizen capacity (what Sugden and other minimalists
call the problem of “reciprocity”), we need to grasp the
reasons motivating Kant’s view.
Kant’s distinction between active and passive cit-
izenship occurs in the empirical remark that follows
his description of the third key attribute of the citizen
considered as legislator in an ideal republic: civil inde-
pendence.18 Kant explains in the general argument
preceding the remark that this civil independence of
the citizen means “owing his existence and preserva-
tion to his own rights and powers as a member of the
commonwealth, not to the choice of another among
16In a significant departure from conventional contract theory,
Kant denies the legitimacy of violent revolution, arguing from the
principle of provisional right to the effect that quick rather than
gradual transitions actually undermine rather than promote the
possibility of eventual good government. The problem of revoca-
ble contracts is a thorny one for contractarians, particularly for
Hobbes, but Kant sets it aside almost too easily. That he can do so
demonstrates that the language of the exit from the state of nature
is less important to Kant than the principles underlying the social
contract in the first place.
17In fact, there is no consistent lesson to be drawn from the polit-
ical science literature on the wisdom of maintaining strict respect
for property rights across political transitions. For an interesting
take on the evidence from the Latin American cases, see Mason
1998.
18In his Rechtslehre, Kant distinguishes between general philo-
sophical argument, which he puts in the main text, and particular
empirical remarks, which he indents. Noting that the study of pol-
itics inevitably involves historical, empirical facts and their rela-
tion to commonly held moral principles, Kant concludes that a
perfectly formal, example-free metaphysics of right would be
impossible and necessarily incomplete; this is why he called his
first section “metaphysical first principles of the Rechtslehre”
instead of the more elegant “metaphysics of right.”
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the people. From his independence follows his civil
personality, his attribute of not needing to be repre-
sented by another where his rights are concerned”
(6:314). Kant knows that he is outlining an ideal stan-
dard that can never be met in practice. Real citizens
are enmeshed in webs of interdependent relation-
ships, just as real states are begun when some one
seizes supreme power and establishes order (6:372; see
also 6:323). What matters is that citizens, considered
as legislators, must be accorded the respect that would
accompany such a feat of civil independence; they
must be treated as if they are independent civil per-
sonalities. Perfect liberty, equality, and independence
are not to be had even among self-legislating human
beings. Nevertheless, their converse qualities of servi-
tude, inequality, and dependence threaten the author-
ity of the citizen-legislators. Rather than concluding
that would-be free people must either undergo deep
social and psychological transformation in prepara-
tion for self-rule, or accept tyranny as their lot, Kant
makes an argument from provisional right. Promote
the possibility of progress toward ideal citizen-legisla-
tors with the counterfactual presumption of their
liberty, equality, and independence, Kant implies, and
one will have powerful arguments to wield when
servitude, inequality, and dependence threaten the
legislators of the republic.
Now all this is very nice in theory, but in practice
Kant actually followed this general, a priori passage
with an empirical discussion of just which citizens
might actually qualify as legitimate possessors of civil
personality. He argues that “an apprentice . . . a
domestic servant . . . a minor [in natural or even
more, in civil minority] . . . all women, and, in
general, anyone whose preservation in existence (his
being fed and protected) depends not on his manage-
ment of his own business but on arrangements 
made by another (except the state). All these people
lack civil personality . . .” (6:314). In perhaps his most
telling example, Kant contrasts the Indian and the
European styles of blacksmith work: the former
carries his tools to his customers, and thus lacks, for
Kant, independence, while the latter works in his shop
and sells his goods on the market, and thus possesses,
for Kant, the requisite quality. With the benefit of
many years’ hindsight, we are able to say to Kant that
embeddedness in market rather than premodern per-
sonalistic economic relations is no guarantee of civil
personality.
But what was Kant trying to achieve with his bla-
tantly “anthropological” point about the social roots
of civic standing? He argues that freedom, equality,
and independence are the qualities that will lead to the
best achievable political judgment on the part of
human legislators.19 With his distinction among
members of society and their qualifications for full
civil personality, Kant is trying to establish authorita-
tive political judgment by the only available means:
the partial, limited human beings that he compares
famously to “crooked timber.” Critics of Kant who
complain about his unrealistic expectations for
abstraction and universalization on the part of ordi-
nary reasoners should consider this part of Kant’s
political work. Here he seeks to approximate authori-
tative political judgment by excluding what he con-
siders to be the social sources of corrupt judgment:
servitude, inequality, and dependence.
Kant recognizes the demands of morality regard-
ing citizenship, but does not believe that the institu-
tions available are up to the task of providing even
provisionally independent citizenship to all members
of society. He admits that “the concept of a passive
citizen seems to contradict the concept of a citizen as
such” (6:314). However, Kant’s commitment to pro-
viding a dynamic theory of politics in the provisional
mode prevents him from simply condemning his
unworthy contemporaries or from revising the stric-
tures of the moral law in the direction of realism.
Instead, Kant insists on the primacy of the moral law
in generating political legitimacy, while imagining
transitional institutions that would make the best
socially possible approximation of the moral law’s cri-
teria while promoting the possibility of getting closer
to those goals. With regard to citizenship qualifica-
tions, Kant tries to identify those among his con-
temporaries most likely to behave as if they enjoyed
fully independent civil personality. Recall that Kant 
is writing from the northeastern hinterlands of
eighteenth-century Prussia; when he compares Indian
with European handworkers, he is encouraging his
fellow citizens of Königsberg to identify with the
European model, not describing an accomplished eco-
nomic transition. Kant’s views on the connection
between civil personality and market rather than per-
sonalized economic relations were typical of enlight-
ened thinking of his era. However, his case for the
provisional exclusion of passive citizens from a role 
in legislation contains none of the usual arguments;
he does not fear mob rule, essentialize second-class
19The distinction between active and passive citizenship is only one
of several mutually incompatible arguments Kant attempts in his
effort to establish the best possible political judgment among
limited rational beings. Elsewhere in his writings, Kant argues var-
iously for disinterested spectators or deliberative scholars to play
this role (7:84; 7:88–89; see also 8:41–42).
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status, or seek to empower a natural aristocracy. Kant’s
worry about participation by those in positions of
dependence has to do instead with the institutional
barriers against free, equal, and independent judg-
ment faced by such people. Far ahead of his time, Kant
recognizes the “private roots of public action” (Burns,
Schlozmann, and Verba 2001). True, there are echoes
here of the classical democratic conception of the
demos as a collection of independent heads of house-
hold, with their status as tyrants in their domestic
spheres guaranteeing independence in their public
roles as citizen legislators. Kant is, as is often the case,
right on the cusp of a modern conception of politics.
Unlike either Rousseau or Jefferson, Kant did not
expect a reordering of society to undergird the auton-
omy required of modern citizen legislators. This
autonomy would have to remain an authoritative if
unreachable ideal toward which citizens strive and by
which they judge each other.
An advantage of Kant’s provisionalism as opposed
to Rousseauian and Jeffersonian radicalism is that in
Kant’s system, citizen self-rule does not presuppose,
but proceeds concurrently with, progressive societal
transformation. For pragmatic purposes, Kant could
not imagine universal citizen self-rule applied to his
society. The gap between the idea of autonomy and
the reality of near-feudal economic and social rela-
tions was too wide. But rather than build a closed
society of self-legislators on the foundation of perma-
nent exclusion, and furthermore given that no really
existing citizen meets the criteria for full civic person-
ality in practice anyway, Kant suggests two means for
approximating the ideal of universal civic autonomy.
First, he requires genuine social mobility: “anyone can
work his way up from this passive condition to an
active one” (6:315). Second, he requires that citizen
legislation be justified in the name of the interests of
all, not just to those who are provisionally granted the
exercise of a civil personality for which they only
partly qualify: “whatever sort of positive laws the cit-
izens might vote for, these laws must still not be con-
trary to the natural laws of freedom and of the
equality of everyone in the people corresponding to
this freedom” (6:315). Elsewhere in the Rechtslehre
Kant argues that positive law must enact what the
general will of the people could hypothetically
approve. From a pragmatic point of view, having to
justify political action in public according to a partic-
ular set of conditions limits the range of possible
action available even to a would-be tyrant. If a provi-
sional republic excludes from active membership
some subgroup of its citizens, then it will have to
demonstrate how excluded citizens can expect to gain
full civil personality, and it will have to argue for pro-
visionally enacted legislation in the interests of all
rather than some subgroup of those citizens.
Conclusion
Kant’s admittedly undemocratic distinction between
active and passive citizenship demonstrates his aware-
ness of the difficult problem of the gap between con-
tractarian demands on citizen capacity and the reality
of widespread citizen incapacity. Provisional contrac-
tarianism emphasizes the promotion of the possibil-
ity of a just political system (moving through
conceivable if not actual consent, toward self-rule).
Such a theory is deeply contractarian, but it is totally
incompatible with the application of the exit-from-
the-state-of-nature test to existing citizens. From a
Kantian point of view, applying the minimalist test
rather than the test of government by consent makes
little sense: the story of the escape from the state of
nature merely illustrates the far more substantial prin-
ciples at the heart of contract theory.
Kant’s theory respects the voluntary ideal of
contractarian citizenship, but not by unrealistically
expecting domination-free interaction in the present
world. Instead, a modern-day provisionalist contract
theory would propose a series of context-sensitive,
continually evolving institutional responses to the gap
between the ideal and the practice of autonomous 
citizenship. Just as minimalist contractarians rely on
public institutions like markets and banks to make
good on their claims for the transhistorical value of
private property, so Kantian contractarians would rely
on public institutions to help them meet the substan-
tive demands of citizenship (6:326; 6:315). Freedom is
at the heart of both strains of contract theory, but the
Kantian strain recognizes that the state is not the only,
or even the primary, source of domination in most 
citizens’ lives. With such a Kantian revision of the 
traditional theory, Sugden’s worries about “baseline”
and “reciprocity” problems are resolved. Minimalist
assumptions about property rights and citizen capac-
ity may now be seen as context-dependent efforts to
realize the provisional conditions of the contractarian
ideal of government by consent.
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